Forensic examinations and audits in corporate environments: technical inquiry into internal fraud, IT contracts and projects, software licensing and digital assets, with documented evidence and a method that withstands adversarial scrutiny.
Under the label of compliance, the market offers standardised adequacy programmes that promise conformity within a few weeks. This forensic unit does something else. The work here is forensic: examining systems, contracts, records and devices in order to establish facts capable of supporting a decision, be it dismissing an employee for cause, terminating an IT contract, responding to a software audit notice or closing an acquisition.
That is why this forensic unit does not promise conformity. Conformity is a state that depends on the continuous conduct of the company; what forensic examination delivers is different and, in a dispute, worth more: the technical and documented demonstration of what happened, of who did what, and of what the records actually prove.
The method comes from computer forensics: preservation of the evidence before any analysis, cryptographic hashing, chain of custody under arts. 158-A to 158-F of the CPP (Brazilian Code of Criminal Procedure) and ABNT NBR ISO/IEC 27037, and conclusions confined to what the evidence supports. The difference lies in the setting: here the object is the company, its systems, its contracts and its people.
Those who turn to this forensic unit are usually the legal department, the board, the audit committee or the law firm advising the company: someone who needs an impartial technical answer before taking an expensive decision.

Corporate litigation, regulatory investigations and international cooperation proceedings frequently require locating and producing electronic evidence scattered across mail servers, corporate systems, laptops and mobile phones belonging to dozens of custodians. Doing that without method means producing too much, exposing what did not need to be exposed, or producing too little and answering for concealment.
The work follows the ISO/IEC 27050 series framework, the international reference for electronic discovery, which organises the process into linked and documented phases. The result is a defensible body of evidence: every document produced has its origin, hash and processing trail on record.
Technology projects fail often, and the contract alone rarely says where responsibility lies. Forensic examination reconstructs the project from the evidence: proposals, schedules, minutes, emails, support tickets, code and system logs.
A go-live postponed or disastrous, corrupted data migration, endless customisations. The examination separates what was the implementer's obligation, what depended on the client and what the product was never able to do, and sizes the breach in technical terms.
Item-by-item comparison between contracted scope and actual delivery: requirements, acceptance records, SLAs, schedules and technical evidence of operation. A basis for termination, claims, defence or well-founded renegotiation.
Technical examination of systems in production: how features actually work, availability, content published on a given date and adherence of what was developed to what was specified, with a record fit to support court proceedings.
Forensic assessment of technology assets in mergers, acquisitions and investments: ownership and quality of the code, licensing liabilities, critical dependencies and hidden risks that change the price of the deal.
The allegation arrives through the internal channel, from a manager or from a client: suspected fraud, misappropriation of funds, information leakage, conflict of interest, harassment documented by digital means. From then on, every wrong step is costly: accessing the computer of the person under investigation without formal preservation, confronting before collecting, inadvertently destroying what would have proved the wrongdoing.
A forensic inquiry begins with the silent preservation of the evidence: forensic images of corporate equipment, preservation of mailboxes and system logs, all with hashing and chain of custody.
The examination is impartial by definition: the commitment is to what the evidence shows, including when it clears the person under investigation. The final report documents method, findings and limits, and serves as the basis for the internal disciplinary procedure, for dismissal for cause, for a recovery claim or for a criminal complaint, according to the decision of the company and its lawyers.
The processing of personal data during the inquiry observes the limits of the investigative purpose, with access restricted to what is necessary and segregation of out-of-scope material.
Documented technical survey of the estate: inventory of installed software and the corresponding licences, critical dependencies, single points of failure and business continuity risks. A faithful picture of the environment, backed by evidence, before it becomes the object of a dispute.
Technical defence against audit and infringement notices sent by major software vendors: independent review of the vendor report, identification of counting inaccuracies and a technical basis for negotiation. Also in the opposite direction: investigation of irregular use of the company's own software.
Forensic examination of attendance records in high-volume employment claims: integrity of the clockings, processing and adjustments applied, consistency between the timesheet, the database and the working hours alleged. Mass analysis, with a method reproducible case by case.
Every company knows it may suffer an incident. Few know whether, when it happens, there will be evidence to establish what occurred. The answer depends on decisions taken long before: which records the environment keeps, for how long, in what detail and where.
The preventive forensic audit answers that question. It is not adequacy for certification or a conformity programme. It is a forensic examination of the environment, carried out with the method of an expert examination, which verifies whether the means exist to investigate a cyber incident or a fraud and, where they do not, where maturity needs to improve.
Which systems generate access logs, how long they are kept and whether they carry what the inquiry will ask for: user, time with time zone, source address and source port. A log that expires before the incident is discovered is evidence that does not exist.
Who has administrator access, how those accounts are used and whether their trail makes it possible to know who performed each action. Many attacks pass through them, and it is on them that the inquiry usually stumbles.
Workstations and servers examined for data that should not be there. A critical finding reaches the company by formal preliminary notification, before the final report.
Whether the anti-fraud controls work in practice, and not just on paper: what they record, what they let through and where the process gaps are.
After an incident or a fraud, the same examination becomes a post-incident assessment. Identities, privileged accounts and logs are reviewed so that the next inquiry does not stumble on the same gaps. When authorship cannot be established for lack of records, the opinion says so frankly and brings the plan for the traces to exist next time.
Challenge. A company that had suffered fraud through unauthorised access to its systems wanted to reach the perpetrator from the connection logs.
Method. The examination cross-checked the logs of the unauthorised accesses with the data supplied by the carriers and narrowed the list down to a few hundred suspects.
Outcome. The inquiry stopped there. The company did not keep the source port of the connections, and without it there was no way to separate the perpetrator from the other subscribers sharing the same IP address. A forensic audit carried out before the incident would have shown that gap in time.
The adjustment of a cyber claim depends on two things: the insured showing what happened, and the environment matching what the company declared when it took out the policy. If the environment keeps no records, or if the controls declared in the application questionnaire do not exist in practice, the denial of cover arrives precisely when the company most needs the insurance.
The forensic assessment carried out before the incident compares what the policy and the questionnaire presuppose with what the environment actually has. It points out the gaps in management and in IT controls which, in an incident, would sustain a denial. The company fixes them beforehand and reaches the claim with evidence.
If the incident happens, the examination carried out afterwards reconstructs the timeline with preserved evidence and delivers the information the insurer needs to adjust the claim.
A company takes out cyber insurance and declares, in the questionnaire, that all remote access uses a second authentication factor (MFA) and that access logs are kept for one year. Before renewal, it requests a forensic assessment. The examination finds administrator accounts without a second factor, a remote access server outside the inventory and logs that are erased within a few days. In an incident, each of those gaps could sustain a denial of cover. The company fixes the points, documents the fix and renews the policy with declarations that match the real environment.
Impartial technical inquiry with chain of custody control. The report provided the grounds for the internal disciplinary procedure.
An audit of the vendor report identified technical inaccuracies. Technical negotiation reduced the amount originally claimed by 60%.
Challenge. A company wanted to know whether customers' card data was circulating outside the authorised systems, on the workstations of the sales department.
Method. Examination of the workstations, with preservation and chain of custody, looking for sensitive data outside the authorised systems.
Outcome. Card numbers were stored in plain text on the workstations. The company received a formal preliminary notification before the final report.
See also
Computer Forensics → For Companies → Expert Reports and Technical Opinions →
Before deciding, it is worth seeing what has already come through this laboratory: cases described without identifying the parties, in the format of challenge, method and result.
The intruder's control channel was written into smart contracts. The examination decoded what he had deleted and handed the authorities concrete routes to identification.
See the case Negative proofThe official examination had concluded that he took part. The re-examination showed the links were false positives, and the accused person was cleared.
See the case